

## Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00  
INRE-00 ACDE-00 /026 W  
-----241616Z 023053 /41  
P R 241407Z MAY 77  
FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3299  
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 4047

EXDIS/SALT

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PARM  
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR WARNKE'S STATEMENT OF MAY 24, 1977 (SALT TWO-1187  
)

THE FOLLOIWNIG IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR WARNKE  
AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF MAY 24, 1977

BEGIN TEXT

MR. MINISTER:

I

TODAY I WANT TO DISCUSS IN FURTHER DETAIL THE SUBJECT OF MIRV  
VERIFICATION. AS I MENTIONED IN MAY MAY 13 STATEMENT, THE UNITED  
STATES DELGATION BELIEVES THIS QUESTION SHOULD BE RESOLVED DURING  
THIS SESSION.

II

DURING HE PAST TWO AND A HALF YEARS CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS HAS  
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BEEN MADE TOWARD ACHIEVING A QUANTITATIVE LIMITATION ON LAUNCHERS OF  
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS. IN NOVEMBER OF 1974  
PRESIDENT FORD AND GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV, AT VLADIVOSTOK, AGREED  
TO A NUMERICAL UPPER LIMIT OF 1320 MIRVED MISSILES. SUBSEQUENTLY, IN  
GENEVA, OUR TWO DELEGATIONS AGREED THAT, WITH RESPECT TO ICBMS AND SL  
BMS,  
THIS LIMITATION WOULD APPLY TO THE LAUNCHERS OF SUCH MISSILES RATHER

THAN TO THE MISSILES THEMSELVES. THIS AGREEMENT IS REFLECTED IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF ARTICLE V OF THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT. OUR TWO DELEGATIONS HAVE ALSO AGREED ON A DEFINITION OF MIRVS, AS REFLECTED IN AN AGREED STATEMENT TO PARAGRPH 5 OF ARTICLE II OF THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT.

THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION HAS REVIEWED THE RECORD OF DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES ON THE QUESTION OF DEFINING AN ICBM OR SLBM EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS. ALTHOUGH FORMAL LANGUAGE HAS NOT YET BEEN AGREED

WE BELIEVE THE RERD SHOWS THAT OUR TWO DELEGATIONS HAVE ARRIVED AT A CONINCIDENCE OF VIEWS ON WHAT CONSTITUTUES AN ICBM OR SLBM EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS. IN OUR JUDGMENT, THESE VIEWS ARE BEST EXPRESSED BY A FORMULATION WHICH DEFINES SUCH A MISSILE AS AN ICBM OR SLBM WITH A BOOSTER WHICH IS OF A TYPE THAT HAS BEEN FLIGHT TESTED ONE OR MORE TIMES WITH MIRVS. IN VIEW OF THE STATEMENTS MADE BY BOTH SIDES INCLUDING MRR. MINISTER, YOUR STATEMENT OF MAY 17, I BELIEVE THAT THE DRAFTING WORKING GROUP SHOULD BE ABLE PROMPTLY TO WORK OUT AGREED LANGUAGE FOR INCLUSION IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF ARTICLE II.

### III

BECAUSE IT IS THE LAUNCHERS OF MIRVED MISSILES RATHER THAN THE MISSILES THEMSELVES WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO THE MIRV LIMITATION, AGREEMENT ON WHAT CONSTITUTES A MIRVED MISSILE IS NOT IN ITSELF SUFFICIENT TO ENSURE ADQUATE VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE 1320 MIRV LIMIT

THE UNITED STATES NOTES THAT, EVEN THOUGH A PARTICULAR TYPE OF LAUNCHER HAS BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH A MIRVED MISSILE, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO  
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DETERMINE BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WHETHER ANY PARTICULAR LAUNCHER OF THAT TYPE ACTUALLY CONTAINS A MIRVED MISSILE. FOR THIS REASON THE UNITED STATES HAS PROPOSED THAT ANY LAUNCHER OF A TYPE THAT HAS CONTAINED OR LAUNCHED AN ICBM OR SLBM EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS BE SUBJECT TO THE MIRV LIMITATION CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF ARTICLE V OF THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT. UNDER THIS APPROACH ANY AMBIGUITIES WHICH MIGHT OTHERWISE HAVE ARISEN REGARDING WHICH LAUNCHERS TO COUNT AS MIRV LAUNCHERS AND WHICH TO COUNT AS NON-MIRV LAUNCHERS WILL BE ELIMINATED

THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS PROPOSED THAT THE MIRV LIMITATION APPLY TO "SUCH LAUNCHERS WHICH HAVE BEEN TESTED FOR LAUNCHING ICBMS AND SLBMS" EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS AND "IN WHICH SUCH MISSILES ARE DEPLOYED." IN ANALYZING THIS PROPOSAL A QUESTION ARISES AS TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THESE TWO CRITERIA.

ONE POSSIBBLE INTERPRETATION IS THAT BOTH CRITERIA MUST BE MET BEFORE A LAUNCHER CAN EVEN BE IDENTIFIED AS A MIRV LAUNCHER. THAT IS, IT MUST BE ESTABLISHED FRIST THAT A LAUNCHER IS "SUCH A LAUNCHER" AS

HAS BEEN TESTED FOR LAUNCHING MIRVED MISSILES. IN ADDITION, UNDER TH  
S  
INTERPRETATION IT WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE ESTABLISHED THAT A MIRVED MIS  
SILE  
HAS ACTUALLY BEEN DEPLOYED IN THAT LAUNCHER. BECAUSE IT IS NOT POSSIB  
LE  
TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT A MIRVED MISSILE HAS ACTUALLY BEEN DEPLOY  
ED  
IN A PARTICULAR ALUNCHEE, THIS INTERPRETATION WOULD BE NWORKABLE.

ANOTHER OSSIBLE INTERPRETATION IS THAT ONLY THE FIRST CRITERION  
MUST BE SATISFIED IN ORDER TO IDENTIFY A LAUNCHER AS A MIRV LAUNCHER  
BUT THAT THE SECOND CRITERION MUST BE SATISFIED IN ORDER FOR THAT  
LAUNCHER TO COUNT AGAINST THE MIRV LIMITATION. THAT IS, A LAUNCHER  
WOULD BE IDENTIFIED AS A MIRV LAUNCHER DURING THE CONSTRUCTION OR CON

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VERSION PROCESS BY ESTABLISHING THAT IT IS "SUCH A LAUNCHER" AS HAS  
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BEEN TESTED FOR ALUNCHING MIRVED MISSILES AND SUBSEQUENTLY IT WOULD B  
E  
COUNTED AGAINST THE MIRV LIMIT WHEN THE MIRVED MISSILE HAS ACTUALLY  
BEEN INSTALLED. HERE AGAIN, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR  
NOT A MIRVED MISSILE HAS ACTUALLY BEEN INSTALLED IN THE LAUNCHER.

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00  
INRE-00 ACDE-00 /026 W  
-----241622Z 023118 /47

P R 241407Z MAY 77  
FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3300  
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 4047

EXDIS/SALT

THEREFORE, WITH THE LAUNCHER ALREADY IDENTIFIED AS A MIRV LAUNCHER, SOME AGREED STAGE IN THE CONSTRUCTION OR CONVERSION PROCESS COULD UNDER THIS INTERPRETATION SERVE AS A VERIFIABLE EVENT DETERMINING WHEN THAT LAUNCHER WILL BEGIN TO COUNT IN THE MIRV TOTAL. UNDER THIS INTERPRETATION, HOWEVER, THE SECOND CRITERION IS UNNECESSARY SINCE IT IS REDUNDANT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE VI OF THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT.

FOR THE REASONS JUST CITED, IT IS UNCLEAR TO THE US DELEGATION HOW THE SOVIET PROPOSAL IS INTENDED TO BE INTERPRETED. IT IS THE US VIEW THAT WHAT CONSTITUTES A MIRV LAUNCHER SHOULD BE SET FORTH IN ARTICLE II AND THE POINT AT WHICH THOSE LAUNCHERS BEGIN TO COUNT IN THE 1320 MIRV TOTAL SHOULD BE COVERED IN ARTICLE VI.

IV

IN AN ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF OUR DIFFERENCES, THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION REGARDING THE QUESTION OF SOVIET DEPLOYMENT IN THE VICINITY OF DERAZHNYA AND PERVOMAYSK OF NON-MIRVED ICBMS IN LAUNCHERS OF A TYPE ASSOCIATED WITH MIRVED ICBMS. PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE TOWARD A MUTUAL APPRECIATION OF OUR RESPECTIVE CONCERNS REGARDING THIS SITUATION. HOWEVER, THE UNCERTAINTIES STILL

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SURROUNDING

THE DEPLOYMENTS AT THESE SITES MUST BE CLARIFIED IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A FINAL RESOLUTION OF THE MIRV COUNTING QUESTION.

V

MR. MINISTER, WE ARE AGREED THAT IT IS LAUNCHERS OF MIRVED MISSILES WHICH ARE TO BE LIMITED AND WE ALSO SEEM TO BE IN AGREEMENT ON WHAT CONSTITUTES A MIRVED MISSILE. THERE REMAINS ONLY THE NEED TO AGREE ON WHAT CONSTITUTES A MIRV LAUNCHER. ACCORDINGLY WE HAVE PROPOSED LANGUAGE FOR PARAGRAPH 5 OF ARTICLE II AND THE ACCOMPANYING AGREED STATEMENT, WHICH IN OUR VIEW IS APPROPRIATE AND WILL ENSURE THE VERIFIABILITY OF THE MIRV LIMIT.

I HOPE THAT MY COMMENTS TODAY WILL HELP TO CLARIFY THE UNITED STATES POSITION AND CONTRIBUTE TO FUTURE PROGRESS IN FORMULATING AGREED LANGUAGE.

I AM INTERESTED IN HEARING YOUR FURTHER VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT.  
END TEXT. WARNKE

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## Message Attributes

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